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C. S. Lewis and the Nature of the Fall
Mary R. Bowman
Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
impurity much rather: that which purifies is trial, and trial is by 
what is contrary. That virtue therefore which is but a youngling 
in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost that vice 
promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a blank virtue, not 
a pure. (Milton, Areopagitica 728-29)
WITH the recent publication o f the last volume in Philip Pullman’s His 
Dark Materials trilogy, C. S. Lewis has received a new wave of publicity—  
largely negative— as numerous articles and interviews have recorded Pullman’s 
dislike of Lewis’s work, especially the Narnia series. While his opinions are to a 
large extent a matter of taste and to that extent not matter for scholarly concern, 
some of his remarks reflect interpretations of Lewis’s work that merit further 
exploration.
One issue that comes up repeatedly in Pullman’s comments is the absence of 
Susan from the “inner” Narnia where the rest of the English visitors to Narnia 
find themselves reunited at the conclusion of The Last Battle. Pullman objects 
mightily to Susan’s “exclusion” and what it seems to imply about Lewis’s attitudes 
toward adulthood. Susan, he claims, “is shut out from salvation because she is 
doing what every other child who has ever been born has done— she is beginning 
to sense the developing changes in her body and its effect on the opposite sex” 
(qtd. in Eccleshare). In Pullman’s interpretation, the adult nature of Susan’s interests 
is the crucial point, and her being “shut out” reflects Lewis’s profound disapproval, 
even horror, of maturation: “he turns away in horror, explicitly with horror, from 
the process of growing up.” This disapproval, moreover, has a clear religious source 
and significance: ‘“In other words, she’s growing up. She’s entering adulthood,’ 
says Pullman. ‘Now this for Lewis, was something [...] so dreadful and so redolent 
of sin that he had to send her to Hell’” (qtd. in Wartofsky). “What he’s saying,” 
Pullman concludes, “is that growing up is something we must avoid at all costs,
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that when you grow up you fall into the clutches of, well, lipstick and nylons, 
which means sexuality, which means Satan [. . .]” (Pullman).
I will eventually argue that this interpretation is misguided, bu t it is a valuable 
one to consider, n o t only because it has appeared so frequently in  the popular 
press, but also because it raises im portant issues in Lewis’s work and brings together 
elements that criticism has no t often connected. This interpretation is, in fact, a 
viable one, bu t it takes certain statements out o f  context and, m ore significantly, 
relies on  certain crucial assumptions: assum ptions about the nature o f  sin, the 
nature o f  the original prohibition, and about the incompatibility o f  wisdom  with 
innocence. Readers familiar with Pullman’s His Dark Materials fiction will recognize 
a consistency between his comments on  Lewis and the cosmology that informs his 
own books, and while it is no t my purpose here to debate the theological issues 
themselves, I submit that it is essential in interpreting (and evaluating) Lewis’s 
fiction to attem pt, at least, to identify the theological assum ptions implicit within 
that fiction. (Indeed, it would be interesting to compare the two cosmologies, 
though it lies beyond the scope o f  my present project.) W hat will emerge is that 
Lewis disagrees no t simply on w hether the Fall was a fortunate one (I believe he 
does disagree with Pullman here) or on the necessity o f  growing up (I believe his 
view actually has m uch in com m on with Pullm an’s), bu t on  those fundamental 
assumptions about innocence, sin, and maturity. Following Pullm an’s lead, my 
main concern will be with the Narnia series, but elucidating these assumptions 
will take me into other works, notably Perelandra.
Such prohibitions bind not
Pullm an’s ow n assum ptions about the nature o f  sin and its relationship to 
maturity— the assumptions that largely drive his reading o f  Susan’s exclusion from 
paradise— are spelled out in some detail in a W isconsin Public Radio interview. 
For him, “sin consists largely o f  curiosity, o r curiosity is largely the em bodim ent 
o f  sin” ; the first sin, “the initial roo t o f  all [other sins, . . . ] was curiosity. The 
serpent said, taste this and you’ll see what good and evil are like. So [Eve] did, and 
those things all came out o f  her initial sin o f  curiosity. T hat’s where it all began, 
and that’s what the W estern Church has been saying for a long tim e” (Pullman). 
In  other words, the Genesis account reference to the “tree o f  the knowledge o f 
good and evil” (Gen. 2.17, KJV) means that the tree literally contains, or directly 
represents, this knowledge, and it was precisely desire for this knowledge that led 
Eve to transgress.
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M oreover, for Pullman, knowledge such as that obtained from  the forbidden 
tree is critical to  hum an developm ent; the inseparability o f  knowledge and sin, in 
his reading o f  Genesis, renders sin an absolute prerequisite for maturity. Though 
innocence is lost, that loss is a necessary step toward growth:
The way I see it is that the loss—and it is a loss— of the innocence and the grace that we 
are born with, is something that’s a necessary stage that we all have to go through, and far 
from lamenting it, we should welcome it, we should accept it as a necessary stage, and we 
should then go on to the next part of our development, because human beings in the 
middle part of their lives, as we are, are on a sort of spectrum, on a sort of ladder if you 
like, a spectrum that leads from the innocence of childhood, if we are lucky, to, at the 
other end, wisdom. (Pullman)
Crucial here is the idea that this wisdom  cannot be com bined with innocence, and 
could no t have been gained w ithout the Fall: “ [T]he point is that innocence, we 
have to leave it behind. Innocence cannot be wise. [...] A nd furtherm ore, wisdom 
cannot be innocent.”
In  short, thinks Pullman, the Prohibition was specifically a prohibition to 
know and therefore a prohibition to mature, and its violation was necessary before 
humanity could explore and develop its full potential. In  this sense Pullman regards 
the Fall as a felix culpa, a “ fortunate fall.” (Though he uses the term  in the W PR 
interview, he makes it clear that the happiness o f  the fall lies in the hum an growth 
that it enabled; his idea o f  the felix culpa thus differs from  the traditional idea, 
which emphasizes the miracles that it inspired: the Incarnation and Resurrection.)
Implicit in this interpretation is the additional assumption that the Prohibition 
was perm anent. W hen Steve Paulson suggests “that if  Eve had never taken a bite 
from the apple, if she had never developed that self-consciousness, that knowingness 
between good and evil, then we would be nothing today, we would be living in 
some state o f  innocence that would be totally dull,” Pullman concurs: “T hat’s the 
clear implication o f  the story. We would still be pets. We would still be children” 
(Pullman). W ithout disobedience, hum an beings would never have acquired 
knowledge o f  good and evil, and thereby wisdom and maturity.
Pullman reads the Prohibition, in fact, m uch as M ilton’s Satan does, and as 
his Eve does after she has begun to  accept Satan’s arguments. In  Paradise Lost, it is 
Satan who takes the Prohibition to m ean that “ ‘Knowledge [is] forbidd’n ’” and 
that it is ‘“sin to know’” (4.515, 517) and w ho assumes that the rule prevents 
development, being “‘invented with design /  To keep them  low whom  Knowledge
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might exalt /  Equal with Gods’” (4.524-6). He succeeds in persuading Eve that 
the injunction is unjust and therefore not to be obeyed: ‘“what forbids he but to 
know,’” she concludes moments before taking the fatal bite, “‘Forbids us good, 
forbids us to be wise? /  Such prohibitions bind not’” (9.758-60). But Milton 
himself elsewhere suggests that it is even now possible for “virtue” to “kno[w...] 
the utmost that vice promises to her followers, and rejec[t] it,” that it is possible to 
“see and know, and yet abstain” (Areopagitica 728-29).
Lewis, good Miltonist that he was, sees things much more as Milton does. 
(And he dismisses the Blakean notion that Satan is the true hero of Paradise host 
as “wholly erroneous,” Preface 94.) While Pullman’s theological views shape his 
own fiction, and rightly so, any commentary on Lewis’s fiction that treats such 
ideas as a given is highly susceptible to error, for Lewis disagrees with Pullman on 
these fundamental assumptions. For Lewis, the Prohibition was not about 
knowledge at all; it was not permanent; far from being a bar to wisdom, it was a 
vehicle to it; and mature wisdom is absolutely compatible with innocence— or 
would have been in an unfallen world.
Different laws in different worlds
In his own analysis o f Paradise L ost, Lewis takes pains to emphasize his 
understanding that for Milton (as for Augustine before him), the Prohibition was 
arbitrary; the point of the forbidding was to give Adam and Eve an opportunity to 
obey God in a meaningful way—not to keep anything of particular importance 
from them:
All idea of a magic apple has fallen out of sight. [. . .] The idea that the apple has any 
intrinsic importance is put into the mouths of bad characters. [. . .] Satan assumes that 
knowledge is magically contained in the apple and will pass to the eater whether those 
who have forbidden the eating wish or no (IX, 721 et seq.). Good characters speak quite 
differently. For them the apple is ‘sole pledge of his obedience’ (IV, 428) [...]. The view 
that if the apple has no intrinsic magic then the breach of the prohibition becomes a small 
matter—in other words that the Miltonic God is making a great pother about nothing— 
is expressed only by Satan. [...] St. Augustine considers the disobedience heinous precisely 
because obedience was so easy. (Preface 68-69)
The Fall, consequently, had nothing to do with the acquisition of knowledge 
per se: “The Fall is simply and solely Disobedience— doing what you have been 
told not to do: and it results from Pride— from being too big for your boots, 
forgetting your place, thinking that you are God” (70-71). The tree is called “the
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tree of knowledge” not because it contains knowledge in itself or even because 
desire for knowledge leads to eating it, but because knowledge of good and evil 
necessarily follows from the act of disobedience: Milton says elsewhere that “[i]t 
was called the tree o f knowledge of good and evil from the event”— “event” here 
carrying its Latin meaning “outcome” (Christian Doctrine 993). Lewis does not 
comment on this point specifically in the Preface, but it will become evident in his 
fiction that he follows Milton on this point as well.
The understanding o f the Prohibition that Lewis so clearly explicates in 
Milton’s poem appears in his own fictional temptations. In The Magician's Nephew, 
Digory is sent to bring an apple from a distinctly Miltonic garden. The garden sits 
at the top o f a “steep green hill” (156) and is bound by a “high wall o f green turf’ 
with “high gates of gold, fast shut, facing east” (157). These few details already 
echo Milton’s paradise, which sits at the top of “a steep wilderness, whose hairy 
sides /  With thicket overgrown, grotesque and wild, /  Access deni’d” (PL  4.135- 
37); and which has “One Gate [...] only [...] and that look’d East” (4.178). The 
importance of Paradise Lost as a pretext becomes even more pronounced after 
Digory enters the garden through the gates, as the inscription on them instructs 
(“Come in by the gold gates or not at all” [Magician’s 157]), and discovers that the 
witch Jadis has arrived there before him. Digory “guessed at once that she must 
have climbed in over the wall” (159-60), in defiance o f the instructions and in 
clear imitation of Satan, who
Due entrance [. . .] disdain’d, and in contempt,
At one slight bound high overleap’d all bound 
O f Hill or highest Wall, and sheer within 
Lights on his feet. (PL 4.180-83)
She has also eaten one of the apples, as the Satan-possessed serpent claims to have 
done (9.575-612), again in violation of the directive on the gates (“Take of my 
fruit for others or forbear”).
Thus, although the scene lacks the primal force of the Edenic temptation 
because Digory is not the progenitor of his race, it is patterned after the earlier 
scene and, at least on an individual level, is infused with the same drama. It is 
therefore significant that neither the tree itself nor the temptation has anything to 
do with knowledge. Aslan assigns no such meaning to the fruit; Digory is told 
rather that it is needed to plant a tree that will “protect” Narnia from the witch 
(Magician’s Nephew 142). Digory is tempted at first by the mere look and smell of
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the apple, not by any metaphysical powers it may possess: “he couldn’t help looking 
at it and smelling it before he put it away. [...] A terrible thirst and hunger came 
over him and a longing to taste that fruit” (158). It is the witch herself who identifies 
the inherent power of the fruit, which imparts not knowledge, but eternal life: “‘It 
is the apple of youth, the apple o f life. [. . .] Eat it, [.. .] and you and I will both 
live forever and be king and queen of this whole world’” (161). Neither eternal life 
nor worldly power proves to be very tempting to Digory, so Jadis appeals to his 
fear of losing his dangerously ill mother: ‘“But what about this Mother of yours 
whom you pretend to love so? [. . . ] [O]ne bite of that apple would heal her’” 
(161). It is only this last appeal which presents a genuine temptation for Digory, 
a “most terrible choice” (162).
Lewis’s belief in the arbitrary nature of the Prohibition is clearly reflected in 
this scene, for the seemingly essential details of the Edenic situation are altered. 
The forbidden fruit is associated not with knowledge, but with life, and Digory is 
tempted not by curiosity but by a child’s desire not to lose his mother. The test is 
one of trust, as C. N. Manlove has explained:
The act that Digory must carry out is one of obedience. His errors before were of self- 
will: he would determine the future and bring it to pass. That is the temptation himself 
and then the Witch put before him at the garden: why should he trust Aslan, why should 
he not take another apple for himself, why should he not use the apple he has plucked to 
help his sick mother rather than take it back for Aslan’s uncertain purposes? He refuses: 
he gives himself back into Aslan’s hand. (176)
It becomes even clearer that Lewis regards the specifics of the Prohibition as 
inessential surface features when we turn to Perelandra, which even more directly 
than The Magician’s Nephew explores the nature of the Prohibition, of sin, and 
obedience. There, the Prohibition does not involve fruit at all, but land: the Lord 
and Lady of Venus are commanded to spend their nights on the floating islands 
only; they may visit the fixed lands only during the daytime. The Lady herself 
observes the accidental nature of the rule when she learns that this particular 
prohibition never applied on Earth: ‘“There can, then, be different laws in different 
worlds’” (74). Margaret P. Hannay, in her seminal analysis of the influence of 
Paradise Lost on Perelandra, relates this important detail to Lewis’s comments in 
the Preface to Paradise Lost (quoted above) rejecting the notion of a “magic apple” 
(86). And it is clear that there is nothing inherently sinful or dangerous about the 
fixed lands. As Manlove observes, “[d]uring the temptation [...] it is actually one 
of Ransom’s strongest arguments that the prohibition should have no inherent
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significance at all, save that Maledil forbids it” (68). The Lady herself comes to 
understand that the temptation is, fundamentally, about trust:
“The reason for not yet living on the Fixed Land is now so plain. How could I wish to live 
there except because it was Fixed? And why should I desire the Fixed except to make 
sure—to be able on one day to command where I should be the next and what should 
happen to me? It was to reject the wave—to draw my hands out of Maleldil’s, to say to 
Him, ‘Not thus, but thus’—to put in our own power what times should roll toward us . 
.. as if you gathered fruits together to-day for to-morrow’s eating instead of taking what 
came. That would have been cold love and feeble trust.” (208)
In his fiction Lewis repeatedly follows Milton in making disobedience not an 
expression of curiosity but a lack of trust, a not allowing God to be God.
What would have happened
An equally significant aspect of the Prohibition as Lewis understands it is that it 
was never meant to be permanent. The Lady of Perelandra implies this in her 
explication of the Prohibition: “The reason for not yet living on the Fixed Land is 
now so plain,”’ she begins (208, emphasis added); “yet” suggests a temporary 
restraint. After the temptation is successfully resisted, her obedience and trust 
tested and proven true, the rules are changed, and the Lord and Lady not only are 
permitted to live on the Fixed Land but are given complete dominion over the 
planet. Ransom comes to understand that “this island had never been forbidden 
them, and that one purpose in forbidding the other had been to lead them to this 
their destined throne” (203-04).
In the same way, Digory’s temptation is about deciding the when and where 
for himself; he is not to be denied help for his mother entirely. Aslan explains to 
Digory and Polly that the “sin” or “fall” of Jadis has to do with intention and 
timing: the fruit is now “a horror to her” because
“That is what happens to those who pluck and eat fruits at the wrong time and in the 
wrong way. The fruit is good, but they loathe it ever after.”
[ • • • • ]
“Things always work according to their nature. She has won her heart’s desire; she has 
unwearying strength and endless days like a goddess. But length of days with an evil heart 
is only length of misery and already she begins to know it. All get what they want: they do 
not always like it.” (Magician's 174)
It is made clear to Digory that he risked the same horror himself when he 
considered yielding to the witch’s temptation: “‘Understand, then, that it would
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have healed [your mother]; but not to your joy or hers. The day would have come 
when both you and she would have looked back and said it would have been 
better to die in that illness”’ (175). But it is immediately made equally clear that 
the crucial factor in such an event was the lack o f permission, not the apple itself, 
for Aslan continues: ‘“That is what would have happened, child, with a stolen 
apple. It is not what will happen now. What I give you now will bring joy. It will 
not, in your world, give endless life, but it will heal’” (175). Having resisted the 
temptation to take an apple without permission, Digory is rewarded with exactly 
what had tempted him: his mother’s return to health.
In this way Lewis demonstrates that the Prohibition was not a permanent ban 
on anything of value: knowledge, life, or anything else. Nor did it impose stasis. 
Rather, it is the beginning of a process. One of the most original and fascinating 
aspects of Perelandra especially is its exploring the question “what would have 
happened if Eve had said no?” As John S. Tanner puts it, “Perelandra envisions 
the prospect of progress without a fall” (131). In this Lewis is once again following 
Milton’s lead. Milton’s Raphael describes for Adam the possibility of growth that 
is available to humankind as long as “ye be found obedient” (PL  5.501):
[. . .] time may come when men 
With Angels may participate, and [. . .]
[................................................................ ]
Your bodies may at last turn all to spirit,
Improv’d by tract of time, and wing’d ascend
Ethereal, as wee, or may at choice
Here or in Heav’nly Paradises dwell. (5.493-500)
Lewis cites this same passage in discussing one of the many points of agreement 
between Milton and Augustine: “If there had been no Fall, the human race after 
multiplying to its full numbers would have been promoted to angelic status (De 
Civ. Dei, XIV, 10). Milton agrees” (Preface 68).
Instead of a permanent barrier, then, the Prohibition and the resisted 
temptation present something more like a crossroads, from which two roads lead 
to the same desired good— knowledge, mother’s health, a settled home—but in 
very different ways. As the Lady puts it, Ransom arrived ‘“at that day when the 
time of our being young drew to its end, and from it we must now go up or go 
down, into corruption or into perfection’” (208). Development of some kind 
would necessarily follow; the issue is of what kind. And though the Perelandrian 
prohibition and temptation did not mention “the knowledge of good and evil” at
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all, the King makes it clear that, on Venus as on Earth, knowledge follows from  
either choice, “ from  the event,” in M ilton’s term s. The unfallen do no t continue 
ignorant o f  good and evil; quite the opposite: through their obedience they have 
acquired knowledge superior to  w hat they would have gained had they disobeyed, 
and indeed superior to w hat hum ans on fallen Earth have. The King explains,
“We know these things now. [ . . . . ]  We have learned of evil, though not as the Evil 
One wished us to learn. We have learned better than that, and know it more, for it is 
waking that understands sleep and not sleep that understands waking. There is an ignorance 
of evil that comes from being young: there is a darker ignorance that comes from doing 
it, as men by sleeping lose the knowledge of sleep. You are more ignorant o f evil in 
Thulcandra now than in the days before your Lord and Lady began to do i t  But Maleldil 
has brought us out of the one ignorance, and we have not entered the other.” (209)
O nce again a passage o f  M ilton’s lies behind Lewis’s: Adam him self makes it 
clear that there is som ething impaired about the knowledge that he and Eve have 
gained by their disobedient choice:
“[. . .] since our Eyes
O p’n’d we find indeed, and find we know 
Both Good and Evil, Good lost, and Evil got,
Bad Fruit of Knowledge, if this be to know[.]” (9.1070-73)
As Charles A. H uttar points out, it is natural for residents o f  E arth  to  adhere to
the notion that only by a knowledge of evil can we fully appreciate the good. Since our 
whole experience bears witness to this obvious truth, it takes a great effort o f the 
imagination, assisted perhaps by rigorous logic, to consider the possible existence of beings 
on this or any other world who might know and fully savor good per se, alone, by itself. 
(126-27)
Perelandra posits the existence o f  just such beings.
Although Aslan tells Lucy, m ore than once, that ‘“no one is ever told what 
would have happened '" (Voyage 136; cf. Prince 137), in both  The Magician’s Nephew 
and Perelandra Lewis allows us a glimpse, albeit indirect, o f  w hat m ight have 
happened on Earth. He creates new worlds, w ith new Prohibitions and new 
tem ptations, where a different choice is made.
Too old for fairy tales
Having eliminated the crucial assumptions— the Prohibition was about knowledge, 
the Fall was about curiosity and therefore was the only path to maturity and
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wisdom— as foreign to  Lewis’s conception, let us return to the opening question 
o f  Susan’s status at the end o f  The Last Battle. I f  knowledge and growth are not 
inseparably linked to sin, why would Susan’s growing up exclude her from salvation?
First o f  all, we should be m ore precise about Susan’s degree o f  maturity. 
Pullman states unequivocally that Susan is growing up, but the imm ediate context 
calls that into question. G ranted, Jill does say that Susan is ‘“interested in nothing 
now-a-days except nylons and lipstick and invitations. She always was a jolly sight 
too keen on being grow n-up’” (Last Battle 135). But immediately Polly— who is 
considerably older than Susan or Jill and has already lived a full life— contests that 
characterization:
“Grown-up, indeed,” said the Lady Polly. “I wish she would grow up. She wasted all 
her school time wanting to be the age she is now, and she’ll waste all the rest of her life 
trying to stay that age. Her whole idea is to race on to the silliest time of one’s life as quick 
as she can and then stop there as long as she can.” (135)
The implication is that Susan is no t in point o f  fact grown up, nor is she growing 
up in what we m ight call an optim al way. She has fixated at a stage along the way, 
a stage characterized not only by her interest in adult things, but also by her rejection 
of, even disbelief in, w hat she regards as childish things. Says Eustace, “ ‘whenever 
you’ve tried to get her to come and talk about Narnia or do anything about Narnia, 
she says ‘W hat w onderful memories you have! Fancy your still thinking about all 
those funny games we used to play w hen we were children”” (135). Though she 
has actually been in Narnia herself, she no longer regards it as real.
An alternate model o f  the process o f  growing up is implied elsewhere in the 
Narnia series. A t the end o f  Prince Caspian, for example, Peter tells Edm und and 
Lucy that he and Susan will no t be returning to Narnia because “‘[Aslan] says 
we’re getting too old’” (215). Though the idea strikes the younger children as 
unbearable (‘“W hat awful bad luck. Can you bear it?” ’ Lucy asks Peter), Peter’s 
own com m ent suggests that he is acquiring a different understanding: ‘“I t’s all 
rather different from what I thought. Y ou’ll understand when it comes to your 
last time.’” W hen Lucy and E dm und are themselves “too old” to return to Narnia, 
readers are privy' to their conversation with Aslan and thus get a fuller picture o f 
the transition they are beginning to undergo:
“You are too old, children,” said Aslan, “and you must begin to come close to your 
own world now. [. . . T]here I have another name. You must learn to know me by that
Mvthlore 91 Summer 2003 71
Mary R. Bowman
name. This was the very reason why you were brought to Narnia, that by know ing m e 
here for a little, you may know m e better there.” ( Voyage 215-16)
The final words o f  Aslan suggest very strongly that the children are not expected 
to reject or forget Narnia as they grow, but they are instead m eant to grow into a 
more adult understanding o f who Aslan is and o f  what their experiences in Narnia 
have taught them, m uch as the King and Queen o f  Perelandra have developed a 
more mature understanding o f  their own innocence w ithout leaving it behind.
Writings external to the Narnia books suggest that Susan’s current rejection 
o f  childish things is a normal part o f  growing up, bu t significantly, no t a final 
stage. In  the dedicatory letter to Lucy Barfield prefaced to The Lion, the Witch and 
the Wardrobe, Lewis tells his goddaughter, “ I  wrote this story for you, but when I  
began it I  had not realised that girls grow quicker than books. A s  a result you are 
already too old for fairy tales, and by the time it is printed and bound you will be older 
still’ (iii). He confidently expects that the non-fictional Lucy will become “ too 
old” for Narnia just as her fictional namesake does. Just as confidently, however, 
he expects this to be a transitional stage, no t a final destination, for he continues: 
“But some day you will be old enough to start reading fairy tales again. You can then 
take it down [. . .] and tell me what you think of it.”
Lewis’s view o f  growing up is presented still m ore explicitly in his essay “O n 
Three Ways o f  W riting for Children.” Responding to the idea that an adult who 
enjoys fairy tales is to be “scorned and pitied for arrested developm ent,” Lewis 
argues that it is the scorners and pitiers who are arrested:
Critics w ho treat adult as a term o f  approval, instead o f  as a merely descriptive term, 
cannot be adult themselves. T o  be concerned about being grown up, to admire the grown  
up because it is grown up, to blush at the suspicion o f  being childish; these things are the 
marks o f  childhood and adolescence. A nd in childhood and adolescence they are, in 
moderation, healthy sym ptom s. Y oung things ought to want to grow. But to carry on  
into middle life or even into early m anhood this concern about being an adult is a mark 
o f  really arrested developm ent. W hen I was ten, I read fairy tales in secret and would  
have been ashamed if  I had been found doing so. N o w  that I am fifty I read them  openly. 
W hen I becam e a man I put away childish things, including the fear o f  childishness and 
the desire to be very grown up. (25)
Though this essay preceded The L ast Battle by a few years, the passage could very 
well be describing Susan. Peter, Digory, and Polly— all older than Susan but still 
believers in Narnia and Aslan— have presumably moved past the stage o f  dismissing 
their childhood experiences as “ funny games,” but Susan has not.
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Lewis continues by characterizing growing up as a process o f  accretion rather 
than replacement:
[S]urely arrested development consists not in refusing to lose old things but in failing to 
add new things? [ .. . .]  I now enjoy Tolstoy and Jane Austen and Trollope as well as fairy 
tales and I call that growth: if I had had to lose the fairy tales in order to acquire the 
novelists, I would not say that I had grown but only that I had changed. (25-26)
This accretion is no t mere accretion, moreover, but includes deepened relationships 
with the “old things” : “I think my growth is just as apparent when I now  read the 
fairy tales as w hen I read the novelists, for I now  enjoy the fairy tales better than I 
did in childhood: being now  able to pu t m ore in, o f  course I get m ore ou t” (26).
It is this accretive type o f  growth that Peter, Lucy, and E dm und (and Lucy 
Barfield) are expected to achieve: “ to come close to [their] own w orld” and “to 
know [Aslan] better there” ; “ to start reading fairy tales again.” A nd it is this m odel 
which Susan resists: she has “race[d]” to  her current adolescent state and wants to 
“‘stop there as long as she can.’” Nylons and lipstick and invitations have no t been 
added to her other interests and tastes, bu t have replaced them: ‘“she’s interested 
in nothing now-a-days except nylons and lipstick and invitations’” (Last Battle 
135, emphasis added). As Robert H ouston Smith puts it, “ [f|or Susan, being grown­
up means regarding G od, beauty, and imagination as worthless fantasies” (176). 
It is not, o f  course, my purpose to  argue for o r against any particular model o f 
growth; one is at liberty to consider Lewis dead w rong on this score. W hat m ust 
be recognized, however, is that within Lewis’s understanding o f  w hat it is to be 
grown up, Susan has a very long way to go yet, and the sentence that for Pullman 
marks her as the m ost grown-up o f  the group would, from  Lewis’s perspective, 
mark her rather as the m ost immature.
Indeed, from  Lewis’s own com m ents on the meaning o f  growing up, we can 
see that he actually agrees with Pullman on  an im portant point: that “the loss o f  
the innocence [. . .] that we are born  with, is som ething that’s a necessary stage 
that we all have to go through, and [ .  . . ] we should accept it as a necessary stage, 
and we should then go on to the next part o f  our developm ent” (Pullman). W here 
they disagree is on the nature o f  that stage, precisely what losses it entails, and 
whether lipstick and nylons are an adequate synecdoche for it. Were it no t for 
fifty years’ anticipation, Lewis m ight alm ost be replying to Pullman:
It is, of course, true that the process of growing does, incidentally and unfortunately, 
involve some more losses. But that is not the essence of growth, certainly not what makes
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growth admirable or desirable. [ . . . . ]  Some critics seem to confuse growth with the cost 
of growth and also to wish to make that cost far higher than, in nature, it need be. 
(“Three Ways” 26)
N othing o f  the child about it
The question o f  Susan’s apparent maturity has been w orth spending some time 
on  because o f  the crucial issue o f  the relationship between maturity and loss o f 
innocence. W hile in a fallen world growing up does entail some losses and a kind 
o f  innocence may be am ong them , the notion that a prelapsarian innocence was 
necessarily childlike and ignorant is one that Lewis directly dismisses.
E ven  w ithin the N arnia books there is an adm ixture o f  childhood and 
adulthood in the children that might call such an assum ption into question, though 
this is no t an issue dealt with centrally in these books. Manlove remarks (with 
disapproval) that “Lewis, basically, wants his children to  behave like adults. They 
are to grow  up spiritually [. . .] bu t also they are to learn to manage their world. [.
. . ] W e have to see them  at once as children and as ‘grow n-up’ in relation to 
N arnia” (122-23). W hile M anlove regards this as a flaw (“In  asking us to believe 
in his children bo th  as children and as adults, Lewis is sometimes in danger o f 
forfeiting our belief in them  as either” 123), it m ight also suggest that Lewis held 
less firmly than some to the idea that being a child and having adult responsibilities 
are contradictory.
Looking outside the Narnia series, we can see Lewis addressing this issue more 
directly, notably in his com m ents on  M ilton’s prelapsarian innocents, and in their 
Venusian counterparts. In  fact, he describes the experience o f  reading Paradise 
Lost as having jolted him out o f  the com m on preconception o f  Adam  and Eve’s 
childishness. He “had come to the poem ,” he reports, with just such an expectation, 
“associating innocence with childishness” and “hop[ing] to  be show n [Adam and 
E ve’s] inarticulate delight in a new world which they were spelling out letter by 
letter, to  hear them  prattle.” In  so doing, he states, he was expecting “something 
which M ilton never intended to give and which, if  he had given it, would have 
gratified a som ew hat com m onplace taste in me and w ould have been hardly 
consistent with the story he had to tell.” Having rid himself o f  these preconceptions, 
Lewis comes to  conclude that “ [t]he whole point about Adam  and Eve is that, as 
they w ould never, bu t for sin, have been old, so they were never young, never 
im m ature o r undeveloped. They were created full-grown and perfect’ (Preface 
116).
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This idea that paradisal innocence and even inexperience are coupled with 
adult intelligence and judgm ent becom es a key elem ent in  the depiction o f  the 
Lady o f  Perelandra. W hat M anlove observes but regrets in the N arnia children is 
made explicit in the Lady: she is a m ixture o f  the childlike and the adult, unknow n 
on the fallen Earth, as revealed in her reaction to  one o f  her learning experiences: 
“A t this point she clasped her hands and a smile such as Ransom  had never seen 
changed her. O ne does n o t see that smile here except in children, bu t there was 
nothing o f  the child about it there” (61). A nd as critics have often observed, she is 
no t the naive child o f  Lewis’s pre-M ilton expectations, bu t rather, as Wayne 
Shumaker describes her, “a creature w ithout m uch experience o f  life bu t endowed 
with enorm ous intellectual pow er” (61). Similarly, M anlove observes a mature 
intellect at w ork during the tem ptation that coexists with her innocence:
She is both guilelessly trusting and intellectually rigorous during the temptation: though 
she trusts both to be speaking the truth and, knowing nothing of evil [. . .], cannot 
perceive the moral difference between the arguers and their arguments, she is at the same 
time of a razor-sharp lucidity that demands that a case made be thoroughly water-tight. 
(61)
O ne o f  the striking consequences o f  this com bination o f  m oral innocence 
with intellectual maturity is the Lady’s ability to learn, without the loss o f  innocence. 
We have already seen that she can acquire the knowledge o f  good and evil by 
resisting temptation better than by succumbing to it, but even before the temptation 
begins we observe her growth, a process that she repeatedly describes as ‘“getting 
older.’” This is a m uch-discussed aspect o f  Perelandra bu t one w orth  briefly 
reviewing here. From  her first conversation with Ransom, she is exposed no t only 
to new ideas and new inform ation about o ther worlds, bu t to new perspectives on 
her own experience and knowledge she already has. As Robert F. Brown puts it, 
Ransom “unintentionally becom es an agent accelerating her m aturation in self- 
consciousness” (56). She perceives the passage o f  time in a new way, ‘“seeing how 
a day has one appearance as it comes to you, and another when you are in it, and 
a third w hen it has gone past’”— an insight she describes as “ ‘great w isdom ’” 
(Perelandra 60). She becom es aware for the first time o f  her possession o f  free will: 
“ ‘this [. . .] is the glory and w onder you have made me see; that it is I, I myself, 
who turn from  the good expected to the given good. O u t o f  my own heart I do it. 
O ne can conceive a heart which did not [ . . . ] .  I thought that I was carried in the 
will o f  Him  I love, but now I see that I walk with it’” (69). In  fact, it is this early
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growth and maturing understanding o f  her obedience to the Prohibition that helps 
her resist the tem ptation once it begins:
“This makes me older far [ . . . ] .  We cannot walk out o f Maleldil’s will: but He has given 
us a way to walk out of our will. And there could be no such way except a command like 
this. [ . . . . ]  I knew there was joy in looking upon the Fixed Island and laying down all 
thought of ever living there, but I did not till now understand.” (118)
Thus although the Lady is never imm ature, she can, and does, becom e more 
m ature than  w hen she started. T he U n-m an observes as m uch in his attem pt to 
convince her that disobedience will further the process:
“He is making you older— making you to learn things not straight from Him but by 
your own meetings with other people and your own questions and thoughts. [. ..] He is 
making you a full woman, for up till now you were only half made—like the beasts who 
do nothing of themselves.” (105)
This is a tem pter’s strategy, bu t like so many o f  his argum ents, it is based on  an 
elem ent o f  truth, as Ransom  recognizes:
Certainly it must be part of the Divine plan that this happy creature should mature, 
should become more and more a creature o f free choice, should become, in a sense, more 
distinct from God and from her husband in order thereby to be at one with them in a 
richer fashion. In fact, he had seen this very process going on from the moment at which 
he met her, and had, unconsciously, assisted it. This present temptation, if conquered, 
would itself be the next, and greatest, step in the same direction: an obedience freer, more 
reasoned, more conscious than any she had known before, was being put in her power. 
(133)
This increased wisdom, o f  course, is also perilous, as the U n-m an’s ability to 
use it in his tem ptation shows, bu t it is im portan t to be clear that for Lewis it is 
the danger o f  losing innocence, n o t the loss itself, that is integrally linked to 
m aturity.
Conclusion: the great divorce
Susan’s interest in “grown up” things is therefore no t inherently sinful, any more 
than it is necessarily dependent on  rejecting her childhood interests and beliefs. 
Why then is she, apparently, shut ou t or excluded from  Heaven, and consigned to 
Hell? The crucial thing for Lewis is that she does it to  herself, that it is a choice she 
makes. A fter all, Peter says that Susan ‘“is no longer a friend o f  N arnia’” (Last
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Battle 134), no t that Narnia or Aslan is no longer a friend o f  Susan. Like the first 
parents on Perelandra, Susan has reached “ that day when the time o f  [her] being 
young drew to its end, and from  it [she] m ust now go up or go dow n” (208); the 
Perelandrians chose one path, Susan the other.
In  a sense she is like the dwarfs. She is no t present in the stable because o f  her 
lack o f  belief; the dwarfs, though they are actually in the stable, cannot see what it 
really is, cannot see or hear Aslan, cannot taste the food and drink he provides: 
evidence, Aslan tells Lucy, o f  ‘“what I can, and what I cannot, do’” (147), a perverse 
testament to the dwarfs’ free will. Lewis is no Calvinist; grace is no t irresistible. I f  
Susan no longer believes in Aslan, even Aslan cannot save her. Like the dwarfs, she 
has ‘“chosen cunning,”’ or in her case nylons, “ ‘instead o f  belief. Their prison is 
only in their own minds, yet they are in that prison’” (148); and in this, as Robert 
Smith has suggested, both dwarfs and adolescent hum an resemble the residents o f 
Hell in The Great Divorce (176, 199).
But Susan’s ultimate destiny is no t known: though the others were killed in a 
railway accident, Susan was not there— ironically, because o f  her very lack o f  interest 
in Narnia. She is, therefore, no t (yet) in Hell; the only logical conclusion is that 
she is alive and well back in England. H er father and m other, w ho by coincidence 
were on the same train (138), have arrived safely in the “real” or “inner” England, 
though they have never heard o f  Narnia and are presumably quite adult: Peter, 
Edm und, and Lucy can see them  “waving back at them  across the great, deep 
valley” (182). W hether Susan ever joins them  will be determined by her own 
choices; she has her whole life ahead o f  her, with time finally to grow up indeed.
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